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Measuring Aspects of Fiscal and Financial Policy
ABSTRACT
The paper develops a forward—looking comprehensive accounting
framework for the publicsector.By integrating the public sector
budget constraint forwardintime the government's present value
budget constraint (PVBC) is obtained. In addition to the familiar
financialassets and liabilities, comprehensive public sector net
worth contains the following items: the value of the public sector
capital stock; the value of public sector property rights in land
and natural resources; the present value of future seigniorage, the
present value of future taxes net of transfers and subsidies and
the present value of future planned public sector capital formation,
privatization or nationalization programmes.
From the "stock" PVBCanumber of different "flow" deficit
concepts are derived; each one emphasizes a different aspect of the
"sustainability" of current and/or prospective fiscal and financial
plans. Together they provide a framework for organizing facts and
plans about fiscal, financial and monetary policy and for evaluating
the consistency of spending and revenue projections or scenarios,
public sector debt objectives and monetary targets.
Willem H, Buiter
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
EC2A 2AE, London
England:asuri: aspects of fiscalan financial poiicy
I. Introduction
A sufficient reason for sendina one's students to read Blinder and
Solow's "Analytical Foundations of Fiscal Policy' (Blinder and Solow
[1974]) is that it Contains the clearest and most accessible statement
of the proposition that informative measures of the impact of fiscal and
financial policy actions or rules on the economy are "model—dependent'.
"Model—free" budget measures of varying ilk may ..."supplya number
summarizing the congeries of taxation and expenditure programs
(Blinder and Solow [1974, p. 12]); they are uninformative about the effects
of these programs on the economy. This holds for the uncorrected or "raw"
public sector financial deficit (level, change, percentage of GDP, at
current or at constant prices), for the cyclically corrected (full —or
high —employmentdeficit), for the inflation—corrected deficit and also
for the new budget measures I have proposed recently (Buiter [1983a, b
1984]), the "permanent deficit", the "constant net worth deficit" and the
constant permanent income deficit, which are discussed in Section II.
Fiscal and financial policy impact measures summarize the effect
of the whole range of budgetary and/or financing decisions on the economy.
Such measures are, of course, functions of the model of the economy whose
"multipliers" are used in its construction. Examples are the "weighted
standardized surplus" proposed by Blinder and Solow [1974, p.23] and the
very similar demand weighted (i.e. adjusted for differences in marginal
propensities to spend on domestic output) and cyclically corrected deficit
measures calculated e.g. in the U.K. by the National Institute of Economicand Social Research. The models that generate these articular
measures of the GDP effect of fiscal policy are static and Old-
Keynesian; output is always demand—determined and the treatment
of expectations ranges between the mechanical and the non—existent.
Anyparticularmeasure itself may therefore not be of great
interest. The iron law: no model —nofiscal and financial impact
measures, is or should be of interest.
Conceptually there is no problem. Those fortunate enough to work
with very small models solve them analytically; all others simulate
numerically their preferred model(s) of the economy under different
values for the fiscal and financial policy parameters. The
differences between the solution trajectories under alternative
policy instrument values or alternative policy rules, or the
differences between the statistics that characterize the solution
trajectories, are ones measures of fiscal impact. Such measures
of fiscal and financial impact will therefore be model-dependent.
They will vary over time, as represented e.g. by a complete series
of dynamic multipliers ,fromimpact to steady state. If
forward—looking expectations are important, these measures will
be functions of the date on which a particular policy action
(or rule change) was first anticipated, of its anticipated degree
of permanence and, with risk—averse behaviour, of the degree of
confidence with which these expectations are held.The practical problems in implementing this approach are almost
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overwhelming. The purpose of this paper is therefore much more
modest. It does not aim to develop measures of fiscal stance or of
fiscal impact. Instead it outlines a forward-looking accountina
framework for the public sector, organized around this sectors
present value budget constraint. It represents a useful framework for
organizing facts, plans, expectations and scenarios about fiscal and
financial (including monetary) policy and for performing consistency
checks between the various components of the fiscal and financial
programme. Section II sets out the accounting framework. Section III
relates some deficit concepts suggested by the accounting framework
to the cnventional public sector deficit measures. Section IV
contains a few illustrations of the uses to which the approach can be
put and Section V discusses some further issues and complications.
II. Measuring sustainability and consistency
a framework for fiscal and financial planning.
The starting point for the analysis is the conventional public
sector budget constraint given in equation (1). It consolidates the
accounts of the budgetary and monetary authorities (the Treasury and
the Central Bank) and of the nationalized industries.
M +B+pC —EF* iB C i*EF* c (1) g+K-T+— +— _PKK_PNN+PNN
1. Blanchard [1983a,b} develops relatively simple measures of fiscal
impact on aggregate demand for a model with forward—looking
rational expectations.g is public sector consumption; K the public sector capital stock;
T taxes net of transfers; i the instantaneous nominal interest
rate on government bonds; B the stock of fixed nominal market value,
variable nominal interest rate bonds; p the general price level;
C the number of consols paying a coupon of one unit of currency;
i'' the foreign nominal interest rate on fixed foreign currency market
value bonds; E the spot price of foreign exchange; F* the stock of
foreign currency denominated assets of the government; K the real
net rental (after depreciation) per unit of public sector capital; N
the real return on a share in public sector natural resource property
rights; N the number of public sector shares in natural resource
property rights; N the real price of a unit of R; M the nominal
stock of non—interest bearing high—powered money and PC the price of
a consol, For any variable x, x x .TheR.H.S. of equation (1)
corresponds to the British public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)
which puts asset sales (- N)above the line rather than below it,
when these asset sales involved the loss of a controlling interest by
the government.
We also establish the further notation: W, real public sector
comprehensive net worth; K' real value of a unit of public sector
capital if it stays in the public sector; T, present value of future
expected taxes net of transfers;II the real capital value of the
state's note issue monopoly; Z, the present value of the government's
future planned investment programme; G, the present value of the
government's future planned consumption programmeand r, the instantaneous
real rate of interest.5
It is assumed that anticipated real rates of return on non—money
assets are equalized. Anticipations of the future are single—valued and
held with complete subjective certainty. For any variable x, x(s,t)
is the value of x at time s, anticipated as of time t, i.e.
x(s,t)Ex(s) where Et is the expectation operator conditional on
information available at time t. We assume that x(s,t) =x(s)s <t,
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From equations (1) and (2) we can derive, after some rearranging of
terms, by forward integration, the present value budget constraint (PVBC)
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or comprehensive balance sheet constraint of the public sector.
-Wecould ofcourseintegrate the budget constraint "at current prices" to
get an equivalent expression to (3) butinvolving discounting future
iominal flows using nominal interest rates. E.g. the simplified budget
constraint g —T=M+E
can be integrated forward to yield
—ii(u,t)du —1i(u,t)du
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2(t) is determined by the terminal boundary condition in the solution
of the first—order linear differential equation that yields (3). It is
conventionally set equal to zero.
If the real interest rate r exceeds the natural rate of growth of
output, n, this terminal condition is implied by the weak requirement
M + B + -
thatthe ratio of marketable public sector wealth [PKK+PNN_
J
totrend output iijus bounded. If the real interest rate lies below
the natural growth rate, however, honest Ponzi games (servicing existing
debt through further borrowing) are feasible and the condition (t) =0
is arbitrary and ad-hoc.r < n is possible as the competitive equil-
ibrium outcome in an overlapping generations model without intergenerational
gift and bequest motives (Diamond [19651). If a child-to-parent gift
motive is operative in a stationary equilibrium of a Diamond—type over-
lapping generations model with gifts and bequests, then this stationary
equilibrium must be characterized by dynamic inefficiency, i.e. r < n
(Buiter [1980], Carmichael [1982]).
In what follows I assume, with a somewhat uneasy conscience, that
3/
=0.
3. Seepage 8.Footnote 3
Considerthe simplified budget constraint g(t) +r(t) b(t) -T(t)=b(t).
Bonds. are short and index-linked. Let g E1, b—, TE- ;g,Tand
y y y
r are constant while y grows at the exogenously given rate n.The
foward—looking present value budget constraint doesn't exist if n >r
as can be seen by inspecting
I (v_r\ (1—c (—r
b(t)=limJ(t-g)e' '" ' ds+b(T)e'' Itis however clear
T-°t




thedebt-output ratio is perfectly well—behaved f or any finite
"fundamental" deficit g— t,witha steady-state value of
One obvious "physical" constraint is 0 < g <1.Thechoice of
borrowing vs. taxes depends exclusively on distributional criteria
and on the relative efficiency costs of debt vs. tax financing. Taxes
need never be levied and may indeed be negative forever. Stanley Fischer
provided me with the example and the insights it contains.11(t) is the present value of the profits earned by the central bank by
investing its entire expected portfolio at each future date (the
counterpart of its liability M) in interest-bearing assets. Integrating
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jp(s,t) JM(s,t)p(s,t)
t t
S(t) is the present value of current and future seigniorage. It follows
that (3) can be rewritten as
(6a) G(t) W(t)
(B(t) +p (t)C(t) _(t)F*(t))
(6b) w(t) PK(t) K(t) +PN(t)
N(t) - p(t)
+T(t)+S(t)+z(t)
Equations (6a, b) characterize consistent fiscal and financial plans.
By analogy with the present value budget constraint of a private agent,
we arrange the public sector P.V.B.C. so that, in present value terms, the
government's consumption programme, G, must be equal in value to its
comprehensive net worth, W. The question whether it makes any sense to
speak of a net worth constraint for the public sector, is addressed below.Tangible assets, K, R and F*, tangible liabilities M, B, and C
and intangible assets T, fl and Z make up public sector net worth, W.
Note, from the definition of Z in (4d) that government wealth is a
function of the future public sector capital formation programme only
to the extent that the shadow price of public sector capital, p,, differs
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from its opportunity cost, 1. If public and private sectors use
capital with equal inefficiency, public sector capital formation does
not alter public sector net worth. Also, privatization of public sector
assets or nationalization of private assets (both at market prices)
affect public sector net worth only to the extent that the assets are
used with differing degrees of efficiency in the public and private sectors..
Equations (6a, b) make clear how a government can finance a planned
increase in the present value of its consumption programme.. It can
raise the present value of planned future taxes net of transfers T or the
present value of its future seigniorage, S (the "inflation tax"). This
higher inflation tax will require a higher proportional rate of money
growth (in a stationary equilibrium) unless the inflation elasticity of
the demand for real money balances is negative and greater than unity in
absolute value. With K and R predetermined, an increase in K (say
brought about by an increase in the efficiency with which public sector
capital is operated) or in (say through an oil discovery or an increase
in the price of oil) can raise pKK and pRR respectively..
W can further be increased discontinuously at a point in time by
4. Note that could be negative, e.g. if the public sector enterprises
operating the public capital are secular loss makers. is only
the net cash return to the public sector.ii
completely or partially defaulting on the financial liabilities M, B
and C, either formally or de facto by engineering an upward jump in
the price level (which is possible in new classical flex—price models)
or a downward jump in through current announcements of future
policy actions. Revaluation of foreign currency—denominated assets
(if a change in the real exchange rate can be engineered) is another
mechanism for altering W discontinuously, as is the announcement, if
K +1,of a change in the future public sector capital formation
programme or in future planned privatization or nationalization.
Equations (6a, b) are a convenient accounting framework for
evaluating the consistency of current and future spending, tax and
transfer plans with the monetary targets, the future capital formation
programme, and the inherited stocks of tangible real and financial
assets and liabilities. They represent a feasthility or consistency
check on alternative fiscal and financial scenarios.
Note that there are likely to be behavioural relationships linking
together the various items in equations (6a, b). E.g. in a Keynesian
world a cut in the spending programme G(t) may lower effective demand
and output, reduce the tax base and thus T, even at given tax rates. In
an economy characterized by financial crowding out (the displacement of
private capital by public sector interest-bearing debt) an increase in
B+p C
c may reduce T etc.
pSustainable or consistent fiscal and financial plans
The government comprehensive balance sheet constraint or present
value budget constraint contains all the information required for an
evaluation of the sustainability of fiscal and financial plans, the
consistency of spending, revenue raising and monetization objectives,
etc. Almost the same information that is contained in this stock
constraint, however, can be expressed in the formof"flow" budget
constraints.
First consider an infeasible or inconsistent plan. This will
be characterized by G —W+0.Such an excess or shortfall of
spending over resources will of course not be observed. Something
will adjust to re-establish equality, whether this takes the form of
changing G or W or both.
Some interest attaches to the perpetuity equivalent or annuity
value of this present value deficit or surplus. This is given by the
"permanent deficit", D.





(8) R(t) Ej e ds
Lt
R(t)is the coupon yield on an index-linked ("real") consol or the long
real rate of interest.D, the permanent share deficit, gives the constantproportion of
capacity output, y, represented by the present value deficitor
surplus. It is given by









The expression "permanent deficit" involves a mild abuse oflanguage
as this deficit will not materialize, let alone be permanent. It does
however represent the permanent adjustment that must be made, either to
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spending or to receipts.
There are two other informative andconvenientmeasures of fiscal and
financial plans: the constant net worth deficit and the constantpermanent
income deficit.
It is easily checked that the expected rate of change of public sector
5.Iam indebted to Stanley Fischer for clarifying these issues.net worth is given by
(11) w(t,t) =r(t)W(t) -g(t)
The current level of public sector consumption can be said tc
be sustainable if it keeps comprehensive net worth constant ex—ante.
This will be the case when current public consumption equals the
short real interest rate times comprehensive net worth, i.e. when
g(t) =r(t)w(t). The constant net worth deficit is then given by
(12) DW(t) E— W(t,t)=g(t) r(t) W(t)
If ones criterion of the sustainability of current consumption
involves a constant (ex—ante) ratio of net worth to capacity output,
the sustainable consumption level is given by g(t) =r(t)W(t) where
r =r-n.The constant net worth share deficit can then be defined as
(13) DW(t) =g(t)—r(t)W(t).
The level (share) of consumption consistent with constant net
worth (a constant net worth share) will of course be subject to
anticipated fluctuations over time if the short real interest rate
varies over time. An alternative permanent income approach to defining
sustainability therefore suggests itself (see Miller [19821, Miller
and Babbs [19831).The highest indefinitely sustainable constant
level of public sector consumption (or permanent income) is given by
multiplying net worth by the long real interest rate:15
(14)g(t) R(t) W(t)
The anticipated rate of change of permanent income is
(15)g(t,t) =R(t)(g(t) —g(t))
The constant permanent income deficit is then defined as
(16)fl(t) =g(t)—g(t)=g(t)—R(t)W(t)
Finally, if a constant sustainable share of public sector
consumption in capacity output is taken as one's criterion
for the sustainability of current consumption, the constant
permanent income share deficit D(t) suggests itself:
(17)Dt(t) =g(t) R(t) W(t)
If DW(t) (DW (t) )ispositive, comprehensive net worth W
is falling (the ratio of public sector comprehensive net worth to
capacity output is falling). This decline in W ()can
y
-
manifestitself in different ways. If PKKI PRR, —,T,S and
Z all remained constant (continued to grow at the natural rate n(t) )
thedecline in W (in )wouldcome about through an increase in
y B+pC
the real stock of interest bearing public sector debt (an
increase in the ratio of interest-bearing debt to capacity GNP). Inmost models that 5 not exhibit debt neutrality, such an increase in
the real debt burden causes financial crowding out. The degree and
time pattern of such financial crowding out is of course model-specific.
If D(t) (D Ct) )ispositive, government permanent income
(the ratio of government permanent income to capacity output) is
SF *
declining.If e.g. R[pKK +pRR
+ + T+S+ZIwere constant
-(ifR[pK +pR
÷ +T+S+Z]were constant) the unsustainability
would show up through an increase in the real cost of debt service
(B+p C)
R (through an increase in the real cost of debt service as
p
a proportion of capacity output).
Note that will coincide with DW if R=r and that D will
be the same as DWif R=r.
To construct these various deficit concepts (except for the
permanent deficit in (7) and the permanent share deficit in (9),
government current spending on goods and services was singled out from
all other outlays and receipts. This reflects the view that the path
of public sector consumption spending over time is one of the four
central concerns of fiscal policy. Two of the other three —distribution
of income and wealth between agents, groups or classes and the efficiency
losses associated with non—lump sum taxes, transfers and subsidies -
cannotbe addressed within a highly aggregative accounting framework.
The last -fiscaland financial stabilization policy -maymake use of this
accounting framework, but only as one input among many. It should be clearhowever that the sustainability of any spending programme can be
evaluated simply by transferring the present value of the relevant
outlays (e.g. transfers plus subsidies) to the left—hand—side of
the PVBC in (6a). The augmented present value of spending aggregate
G, say, and the correspondingly augmented comprehensive wealth
aggregate W ,say,can then be put through their paces as in equations
(12) ,(13),(16)and (17)
III"Deficit corrections"
One instructive way of looking at these new proposed deficit
measures is by listing the "corrections" required to go from the
conventional PSBR to the new measures. In equations CiBa, b) I list
the steps to go from the PSBR to Ct) and (t) respectively.
To get to D or DW instead, simply replace R by R (18a) and
r by r in (18b) and omit n(t) in (18b). To obtain D, the
permanent share deficit given in (9) simply add R(t)G(t) -g(t) on the right-
hand side of (iSa). This substitutes the perpetuity value of the
future consumption programme (corrected for trend output growth) for
current consumption. To get D, the permanent deficit given in (7),
from (18a) replace R by R in (iSa) and add R(t)G(t) —g(t)on the right-
hand—side. Since government consumption spending in the U.K. has tended
to grow in recent decades at the trend rate of growth of output, D and
should not be too different from each other.(iSa) D(t) = PSBR(t)-p(t)N(t) -PK(t)
K(t) +[Rft)-i(t)I
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Since D (t) is probably the more interesting of the two measures,
we shall concentrate on it. The figures are strictly back—of—the envelope
andarefor illustrative purposes only. Taking the corrections to the
PSBR in (18a) in turn:
—
PNN This is a proxy for t—ose net sales of existing public sector
assets that should be added to the PSBR to get the public sector financial
deficit (PSFD) on a national accounts basis.— PK g(t) in (19 a, b)is public sector consumption spending. Many
categories of exhaustive public spending possess characteristics both of
consumption and capital formation. In the illustrative figures for the
U.K. given in Table 1 I finesse these problems by following standard
national income accounting conventions. On this basis, estimates of
public sector net capital formation (at replacement cost) which should
be subtracted from the PSBR and PSFD as one of the steps to get to
are available in the U.K.
B pC
+(R-1)—+ (R——) thisis not merely an inflation and real
P Pc P
growth correction but also involves the permanent income smoothing
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reflectedin the use of the long real interest rate. (This last step
is omitted in (19b).) In public sector permanent income, debt service
on the bond debt should be evaluated by multiplying the real long run
(consol)rate of interest net of the natural growth rate, R(t), into the
market value of all bonds. Estimates for this correction for the U.K.
andadiscussion of its methodological foundations are given in Miller
[1982] and in Miller and Babbs [1983]. They are reproduced here in Table I.
- CF* —(R—j*) — Thiscorrects for chanaes in the domestic currency p -
valueof foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities as well as
for domestic inflation, real growth andpermanent income smoothing.
It is very important for a number of LDC's which have borrowed externally
in dollars or other hard currencies.(See Buiter 119831 .)Itssignificance
forthe U.K. and U.S. is likely to be quite minor.
6.For conventional inflation corrections see Siegel 11979] ,Threadgold
and Taylor 1 1979] and Cukierman and Mortensen 1 1983 1I — (f—— )p K It is difficult to assess the size andmaanituh of
theexcess of current income from public capital over p?rmanent income
and I do not attempt to do so. It is likely to be strongly procyclical.
-
— (P.-—) PNN NorthSea oil revenues are currently at or near their
exrected peak value. While in the mid and late seventies current oil
revenue fell short of its permanent value (as perceived at the time) this
situation is now reversed. The figures in Table 1 are merely illustrative
but are quite conservative, in the sense that they are more likely to
understate permanent oil revenue.
(RT —T) Itshould be clear that current taxes net of transfers
T(t) is likely to be a poor proxy for R(t) T(t). The most important
"corrections' to T(t) required to obtain a better approximation to R(t) T(t)
are the following:
(a)"Cyclical" corrections to tax receipts and transfer payments.
The yield from several major taxes (income taxes, national
insurance contributions, VAT, corporation tax)variesinversely
withcyclical deviations of economic activity from its full
employment,trend or natural level. The optosite correlation
holds for such transfer payments as unemployment benefits. Cyclical
corrections to the conventionally measured deficit are, from
this perspective, desirable not because they provide a better
approximation to the short—run demand effect of the budget, but as
one step towards the calculation of public sector permrient income
or of the permanent deficit.1/ inTable 1 I use the II"s estimates of the cyclical correction.
These are very conservative in that they do not assign a zero
cyclical correction to 1979 but instead assume the cyclically
corrected deficit to be of GDP larger than the actual deficit
in l79 and 1.4% of GDP in 1980.
This seems to indicate an expectation of a normal unemployment
rate in the U.K. of 8 or 9 per cent. The Institute of Fiscal
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Studies, on the other hand, while coming up with very similar
year—to—year changes in the cyclical correction, puts its level
2 to 2½percentagepoints of GDP higher. What matters for the
sustainabilitycalculation is that a reasonable proxy for the
expected average future levels of capacity utilization and unemp-
loymentbe used. These levels may well be functions of the fiscal
policiesadopted by the authorities andneednot be equal to any
"natural" or "full employment" values.
(b) There may be planned,projected or exnected changes in the scale
and scope of certain tax and benefit programmes. E.g. under existing
legislation governing contributions and benefits, the greying of
the U.K. population implies a growing excess of pension payments
over contributions. Similar concerns have been voiced in the U.S.
Whileone could tryto makesome further rough structural or demographic
corrections to the "cyclically corrected" tax and transfer total,
I have not done so in Table I.
7. 1MF World Economic Outlook.
8.John Kay 11983]- Theperpetuity value of future seignioraae revenue is not
so easily determined. Following the definition of S(t) given in (Sb)
one must estimate future government plans for monetary base growth




S(t)=R(t)IM(s,t) M(S,t) e ds. — ) M(s,t) —
y(t) p(s,t) y(s,t)
If both the rate of monetary growth and the income velocity of circul-
ationof money are expected to be constant, then
R(t) S(t) = ... permanentseigniorage income relative
to trend output equals its current value. I will make this assumption,
but the overall outcome is not very dependent on it as the amounts involved
are fairly small.
— — 1) K) This corrects for the excess of
thecurrent efficiency loss associated with public sector caDital


























































- PSBR,PSFD :ET May 1983, 56
— : E]ue BookY82 cd. 1.7 1cr 17&-18i.
1982on eztim.t€.
—PermanentDebt Service Correction: Miller and Babbs 11983 1.
—NorthSea Oil Correction: Own calculations based on NIER, May 1983.
F,J.Atkinson, S.J. Brook and S.G.F. Hall,
"TheEconomicEffects of North Sea Oil", pp 38—44;
IFS, John Kay ed., The Econoy and the 1983 Budget;
M.P. Devereux, "Changes in the Taxation of North Sea
Oil", pp. 75—79.
-CyclicalCorrection: IMFWorldEconomic Outlook, 1982, Table 49, p.1E7.
—PermanentSeigniorage Correction: Monetary base x long—run real rate;
Source: Miller & Babbs 119831Adopting the IFS cyclical correction instead of the one ca1cu1ate
by the IMF would lower the permanent deficit by 2 to 2percent of GDP
compared to the figures in the last column of Figure II. Together with
a slightly more generous estimate of the permanent income from North Sea
oil this would generate a 5 or 6 per cent of GD? permanent surplus in
1982. This would leave room for a sizeable sustainable increase in the
share of public consumption spending in trend GDP over its current level
and/or a cut in taxes or increase in transfer payments. Alternatively
the government could choose to indulge in a bout of financial "crowding
in", using its "permanent" surplus to reduce the real stock of interest—
bearingdebt. The U.K. economy, unlike the USA, would appear to have had
a lot of fiscal elbow room in 1981 and 1982.
Oneadvantage of the PVBC approach and of the various deficit
measures I have derived from it, is that they permit one to make
sense of many of the corrections to the conventionally measured deficit
that have been proposed in a more ad-hoc manner in the literature. Among
these are "inflation corrections" (Siegel [1979], Taylor and Threadgold
[1979]; Jump [1980]; Boskin [1982]; Buiter [1982a, b ;1983];Miller
[1982]; Miller and Babbs [1983]; Cukierman and Mortensen [1983] )
permanent cost of debt service corrections (Miller [1982] ,Millerand
Babbs [1983]), corrections for public sector capital formation (Buiter
[1982 (a, b) ,1983],Boskin [1982], Hills [1984]), corrections for
certain intangible assets and liabilities (Boskin [1982], Hills [1984])and
cyclical corrections.IVSome applications
Eventual Monetization
The apparatus developed here can be applied to the calculationof
the long—run" monetary growth rate implied by the fiscal stance.




M(s,t) M(s,t)e ds =G(t)
JM(s,t) p(s,t)
t
r (B(t)+p (t)C(t) _E(t)F*(t))
-
;PK(t)





This tells us what the amount of revenue to be raised through
seigniorage (the "inflation tax") is (in present value terms) given
the spending Drogramme and the government's tangible and intangible
non-monetary assets and liabilities. Solving this for a constant rate
of monetary growth and a constant income velocity of circulation









If the long-run inflation rate is governed by the rate of growth
of the money supply, say =- n,and if the inflation elasticity of
velocity is less than unity, a higher monetary growth rate and a higher
rate of inflation are implied by a higher present value of public spending
relative to non-monetary assets and liabilities. Only if the public
sector's consumption and tax programmes, together with its non—monetary
assets and liabilities, imply a high value of in (19), is a fiscal
correction a necessary condition for achieving credibility for an anti—
inflationary policy. If we consider only stationary long-run equilibria,
(19) becomes
H -i (PKK+PRR+Z (B+pcC_F*))______ (19') =V——(r—n)i —
—
— J + — L i
Eventualmonetary growth is governed in steady state by the trend public
sector current account (or consumption account) deficit, with debt service
evaluated at the real interest rate net of the natural rate of growth.
This deficit measure can differ dramatically from the conventionally measured
public sector financial deficit or PSBR, which is often and erroneouslytaken as an indicator to eventual monetization.(See Sarqent
[1931] ,Sargentand Wallace [1961] and Buiter [1982a, bj and
Buiter [1983]
Financial crowding out pressure
The change in the real stock of interest-bearing debt or in the
interest—bearing debt output ratio is often considered to be important,
because in many macromodels such changes are the proximate
determinants of changes in the degree of financial crowding out
pressure —thedegree to which the public sector competes with the
private sector for investible resources. Following Sargent and Wallace
B+p C
[1981] we may ask what governs thebehaviourof _, onthe
py
K N
assumption that p ,p and areall kept constant. The K N py
answer is given in (20).
(20)(t,t) = + (r-n)r C_cF*)pl_pKK_PNN
M
L ..J
Thechange in the real "burden" of government interest—bearing debt
is given by the non—monetized part of the government's current,
inflation —andreal growth —correcteddeficit as a proportion of
trend GDP.Clearly, the anticipated future path of 6 can be
evaluated for anysetof assumptions concerning future behaviour ofpublic sector capital formation, asset sales and external debt
accumulation. Equation (20) is merely a convenient benchmark.
VConclusion
There remain three loose ends to be tied up. First, how should
one view the partial balance sheets, often including only the tangible,
explicit and/or potentially marketable assets and liabilities of
the public sector? Second, there is the related question as to
whether the concept of public sector net worth makes sense. Third,
what discount rates should be used in the present value calculations
when there are non—lump sum taxes?
Tangible or potentially marketable public sector net worth
Frequently analysts focus on a subset of the items in the PVBC.
A recent example is Hills [1984] who considers a U.K. government
balance sheet consisting mainly of physical and financial assets and
liabilities, although future oil revenues, corporations' deferred
tax, state pension rights and unfunded public service pensions are
included. In terms of the PVBC in (6a, b) Hills omits most but not
all of T(t) ,thepresent value of taxes net of transfers, subsidies,
etc. ,allof S(t), the present value of future seigniorage and all of
z(t) ,thepresent value of future public sector capital accumulation.
There is no harm in principle in focussing on the tangible and/or
(potentially) marketable items in the comprehensive public sector balancesheet. Indeed, it is not hard to think o: behavioural models in
which the impact of explicit, tanoible assets and liabilities
differs significantly from that of implicit, intangible assets
and liabilities that often reflect no more than the uncertain and
reversible plans or promises of current and past and antictpated future
overnmefltS.
Nevertheless, the omission of T, S and Z may give a distorted
perspective on the fiscal and financial options actually open to the
government; great care should be taken when making projections of a
restricted public sector net worth concept, that the omitted balancing
items aren't implicitly asked to behave in an impossible or implausible
manner.
Does the concept of public sector net worth make sense?
It has been argued by several economists that the notion of "net
9/
worth" of the public sector makes no sense. I believe that any
disagreement on this matter is largely semantic. If the discount
rate exceeds the natural rate of growth and if the certainty equiv-
alence assumption we make is acceptable, then equations (6a, b) ,the
PVBC, makes sense. The only issue is whether W should be called public
sector net worth or something else. T, S and Z are the present discounted
values of expected or planned future taxes net of transfers, seigniorage
and capital formation. That means that W is to a large extent a
choice variable of the government.
;. Richard Musgrave made this point forcefully at the February1984
meeting of the ISPE in Santa Cruz.When applied in a private sector context, net worth has the
connotation of something that is predetermined from the point of
view of the individual agent, i.e. something parametric in the
10 /
shortrun. Net worth is defined as the sum of non—human capital
and human capital. Human capital is the present discounted value
of the future stream of labour endowments. If employment is a choice
variable, and if we define human capital as the present discounted
value of future labour income (as is done occasionally) rather than
of future labour endowments (labour time plus leisure time),thenthe
private net worth concept would be perfectly analogous to our W.
The counterpart to the private endowment of labour is the public sector's
maximum tax yield, i.e. its capacity to levytaxesrather than the
11/
taxesit actually expects or plans to levy. Wecould have entered
the maximal present discounted value of future potential tax receipts
in the P.V.B.C. on the asset side andtheexcess of this maximal
present value over the actual planned or expected present value on the
liability side as a present value transfer (analogous to the present
value of leisure time in the private sector case). Netting out the
maximal present value of future taxes from the PVBC as is done in this
paper, is misleading only if planned future taxes violate the taxable
capacity constraint.
10.Note that through the possibility of deliberate (dishonest) default,
even private net worth will be to some extent a choice variable at
a point in time.
11.The upper bound on the capacity to tax is certain tobe lessthan the
physical upper bound of 100% of pri:e income ndislikely to be
political in nature.The discount rate for the present value calculations
Assume there is a tax at a proportional rate V. on interest
1
income, a capital gains tax (with full loss offset) at a proportional
rate vand taxes on natural resource income and caDital income at
C
-
ratesVN and VK respectively. Capital gains or losses due to
general inflation are not taxed. and are now the nominal
rentals and and the price of resource rights and capital
in money terms.
The arbitrage conditions in (2) now become
(21)(t) =i(t)(1-v p(t,t)= 1



















The budget constraint (1) is of course still valid; taxes on
interest are included in T and interest payments or receipts are
entered gross of tax.It is easily checked that the PVBC(6a,b) still holds, provided
the following changes are made.
1) The instantaneous discount rate is r(t) defined in (21) rather
than r(t).
2) The present value of central bank profits is no longer 11(t) as
in (4c) but 11(t) which is defined by
S
—Ir(u,t)du
11(t) i(s,t)(1—v.) M(St)et ds. Note that this
) 3-p(s,t)
t
makes no difference to S(t), other than the replacement of r(u,t)
by r(u,t) in (5b).
3) The stream of total taxes net of transfers T that is discounted
to yield T in (6a, b) is replaced by
C -N-r, K-EF*
-'
F(iB+ C - cN K TT—vj )+v
(1 p c p
-vNPNN-vKPKK
p p
Thus gross taxes t are replaced by taxes net of anyreceiptsfrom
income and capital gains taxes on the assets and liabilities
appearing in the budget constraint.
The main implication is that after-tax rate of interest should beused to discount future flows of ievenue anu expenditure.
It should be clear that neither tne PVBC in (6a, b) nor the
permanent deficit, the constant net worth deficit or the constant
permanent income deficit are measures of fiscal stance or fiscal
impact. They provide a useful framework for organizing facts and
plans about fiscal, financial and monetary policy and for evaluating
the consistency of spending and revenue projections, public sector
debt objectives and monetary targets. Its weakest feature is its
cavalier (heroic?) use of certainty equivalence. Even that strong
assumption does not purchase us any information on short—term, medium—
term or long—term fiscal impact. For that we need a specific macro-
economic model.
The construction of informative measures of fiscal impact very
soon requires an amount of effort and calculation that renders it
observationally equivalent to performing policy evaluation exercises on
complete sequential general equilibrium models. While the simple model—
free" balance sheet and budget measures proposed in this paper are
essential for consistent fiscal and financial planning, the PVBC and its
associated deficit concepts are prone to be misused as measures of
fiscal impact on economic activity. It is unfortunately a fact that
"model—free" measures become the natural habitat of implicit theorizing.
They should perhaps be made to carry an official health warning.35
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